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The Master Limited Liability Partnerships 
Parity Act: Friend or Foe? 
SONIA J. TOSON* 
 
In April of 2013, Democratic Senator Chris Coons of 
Delaware introduced legislation that seeks to level the playing 
field between renewable and non-renewable energy companies.  
Titled the “Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act” (MLPPA), 
the legislation would amend the federal tax code to allow 
renewable energy companies to form master limited partnerships 
and thereby gain valuable financing and tax advantages.  This 
legislation would clear the way for the formation of master 
limited partnerships investing in renewable energy, which would 
have significant impact on clean energy production in the United 
States.  This article discusses the Master Limited Partnerships 
Parity Act and explores the advantages and disadvantages of 
master limited partnerships as a business organization for 
renewable energy companies and ultimately argues for the 
passing of this valuable legislation. 
The article is divided into six sections.  Part I defines master 
limited partnerships and examines their corporate structure and 
how they operate as compared to other types of business 
organizations.  Part II delineates the history and evolution of 
master limited partnerships over the last thirty years.  Part III 
describes the Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, including 
its history, purpose and aims.  Part IV then details the 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Kennesaw State University. The author 
wishes to acknowledge the Sisters of the Academy (SOTA) organization and the 
organizers and participants of the 2013 SOTA Research BootCamp held at 
Florida State University. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Celeste Walley-Jean, 
Dr. Cassandra R. Cole and Prof. Shakealia Finley for their invaluable guidance 
and insight on this article. 
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arguments in support of the Master Limited Partnerships Parity 
Act, while Part V gives the arguments in opposition to the Act.  
The article then concludes in Part VI with the author’s 
recommendations and conclusions that the Master Limited 
Partnerships Parity Act is a step in the right direction for the 
development of the clean energy sector and environmental 
protection in the United States. 
I. WHAT IS AN MLP? 
Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) are by definition 
limited partnerships that are publicly traded1 on a national 
securities exchange.2  Ownership interests in MLPs are referred 
to as “common units” and are similar in nature to common stock 
in a corporation.3  MLPs are afforded flow-through taxation while 
still offering limited liability to unit-holders, which makes them 
an attractive business structure for investors.  According to 
Senator Coons, a Democrat from Delaware, who proposed initial 
legislation expanding access to MLPs, “MLPs combine the 
flexibility of a corporation with the tax benefits of a partnership, 
creatively stimulating private investment in energy projects.”4  
MLPs, however, are statutorily restricted to investments in 
depletable energy sources such as oil, natural gas, coal extraction, 
and pipeline projects.5 
 
 1. A publicly traded company is defined by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as “a company that has a class of securities that is registered with 
the Commission because those securities are widely held or traded on a national 
securities exchange.” Going Private, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/gopriv.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 2. MLPs are a type of “publicly traded partnership.” While most MLPs are 
limited partnerships, they may also be limited liability companies (LLCs) that 
are publicly traded. Both types of entities function the same way in terms of 
limited liability and pass-through taxation. See MLP Basics for Investors, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF PUBLICLY TRADED P’SHIPS, http://www.naptp.org/PTP101/ 
BasicFacts.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 3. John Goodgame, New Developments in Master Limited Partnership 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 81, 82 (2012). 
 4. U.S. SENATOR CHRIS COONS, MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS PARITY ACT 
(2013), available at http://coons.senate.gov/download/mlp-white-paper/; see also 
Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, H.R. 1696, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 5. I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E) (2012). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/5
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Section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) specifically 
states that a publicly traded partnership is any partnership 
whose ownership interests are traded on an established securities 
market6 or are readily tradable on a secondary or equivalent 
market.7  Section 7704 also mandates that all publicly traded 
 
 6. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7704–1(b) (2014). An established securities market is 
defined is: 
(1) A national securities exchange registered under section 6 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78f); 
(2) A national securities exchange exempt from registration under 
section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78f) 
because of the limited volume of transactions; 
(3) A foreign securities exchange that, under the law of the 
jurisdiction where it is organized, satisfies regulatory requirements 
that are analogous to the regulatory requirements under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 described in paragraph (b)(1) or (2) 
of this section (such as the London International Financial Futures 
Exchange; the Marche a Terme International de France; the 
International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland, Limited; the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; and the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange); 
(4) A regional or local exchange; and 
(5) An interdealer quotation system that regularly disseminates firm 
buy or sell quotations by identified brokers or dealers by electronic 
means or otherwise. 
Id. § 1.7704–1(b)(1)-(5). For more information on interdealer quotation systems 
referenced in subsection (5), see Over-the-Counter Market, SEC, http://www.sec. 
gov/divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml (last updated May 9, 2013). 
 7. Secondary or equivalent market, as referenced in the abovementioned 
definition of publicly traded partnership, is defined in the following manner: 
Interests in a partnership that are not traded on an established 
securities market… are readily tradable on a secondary market or 
the substantial equivalent thereof if, taking into account all of the 
facts and circumstances, the partners are readily able to buy, sell, or 
exchange their partnership interests in a manner that is 
comparable, economically, to trading on an established securities 
market. 
…[i]nterests in a partnership are readily tradable on a secondary 
market or the substantial equivalent thereof if— 
(i) Interests in the partnership are regularly quoted by any 
person, such as a broker or dealer, making a market in the 
interests; 
(ii) Any person regularly makes available to the public (including 
customers or subscribers) bid or offer quotes with respect to 
interests in the partnership and stands ready to effect buy or sell 
transactions at the quoted prices for itself or on behalf of others; 
3
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partnerships must generate at least 90% of their income from 
qualified sources.8  Section 613 of the IRC further specifies that 
that the source of qualifying income must be depletable 
resources.9  Qualifying natural resource activities include 
exploration, development and production, mining, gathering and 
processing, refining, compression, transportation, storage, 
marketing and distribution, and propane sales.10 
As publicly-traded partnerships, MLPs are subject to these 
qualifying income rules.  Here lies the problem: investments in 
renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, hydroelectric and 
geothermal are specifically excluded from this definition and are 
therefore prevented from organizing as master limited 
partnerships and acquiring the benefits that accompany this 
corporate structure. 
A.  Current MLPs 
As of June 2014, there were 117 registered MLPs.11  Of those, 
forty-four percent are in the pipeline industry, thirteen percent 
are exploration production companies, nine percent are 
designated as “other,” five percent are storage companies, five 
percent are coal companies, five percent are shipping companies, 
four percent are propane companies, four percent are refining 
companies, three percent are oil and gas shipping services, three 
percent are fertilizer companies, three percent are compression 
 
(iii) The holder of an interest in the partnership has a readily 
available, regular, and ongoing opportunity to sell or exchange 
the interest through a public means of obtaining or providing 
information of offers to buy, sell, or exchange interests in the 
partnership; or 
(iv) Prospective buyers and sellers otherwise have the 
opportunity to buy, sell, or exchange interests in the partnership 
in a time frame and with the regularity and continuity that is 
comparable to that described in the other provisions of this 
paragraph (c)(2). 
26 C.F.R. § 1.7704–1(c)(2) (2014). 
 8. I.R.C. § 7704(c), (d). 
 9. I.R.C. § 613. 
 10. With the exception of propane, retail sales are not included. 
 11. Master Limited Partnerships List, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, 
http://www.lw.com/MLP-Portal/MLPList (last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/5
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companies, and one percent are timber companies.12  The figure 
below depicts the proportion of MLPs within each industry:13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  MLPs Compared with Other Types of Entities 
MLPs share some characteristics with other types of 
business entities, but it is the combination of high-yield 
distributions and significant tax advantages that set it apart from 
other business organizations. 
Note the comparison between MLPS and other corporate 
structures below:14 
 
 12. Latham & Watkins, LLP. Id. 
 13. Chart adapted from data compiled by Latham & Watkins, LLP. Id. 
 14. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, COMPARISON OF BUSINESS 
ENTITIES (2009), available at http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/tax/resources/ 
taxpracticeimprovement/2009taxpracticeguidesandchecklists/downloadabledocu
ments/03_09_comp_of_bus_ent_092009.pdf; Chart of Entity Comparison, 
HENNINGER ACCOUNTING SERVICES, P.C., http://www.henningercpa.com/site/ 
images/PDF/Forms/natpchartentitycomparison.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014); 
Stephen Maresca et. al., MORGAN STANLEY, MIDSTREAM ENERGY MLPS PRIMER 
Pipeline, 
44.0% 
Exploration 
Production, 
13.0% 
Other, 9.0% 
Storage, 
5.0% 
Coal, 5.0% 
Shipping, 
5.0% 
Propane, 
4.0% 
Refining, 
4.0% 
Shipping, 3.0% 
Fertilizer, 
3.0% Compression, 
3.0% 
Timber, 1.0% MLPs by Industry 
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Feature General 
Partnership 
Limited 
Liability 
Company 
Master 
Limited 
Partnership 
C-Corp. S-Corp. 
Owner 
Liability 
Unlimited Limited to 
capital 
investment 
Limited to 
capital 
investment 
Limited to 
capital 
investment 
Limited to 
capital 
investment 
Taxation Pass-through Pass -through Pass -
through 
Double 
Taxation 
Pass -
through 
Duration Cessation of 
business; 
ceasing to 
operate as a 
partnership; 
sale or 
exchange of 
50% or more 
of the profits 
and capital 
within a 12-
month 
period; may 
terminate 
with death of 
partner if 
agreement 
specifies  
Per Articles 
of 
Organization 
or state 
requirements 
Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing 
Publicly-
traded 
No No Yes Yes No 
Ability 
to raise 
capital 
Partner 
contributions 
Member 
contributions, 
possibly sale 
of 
membership 
interests 
subject to 
operating 
agreement 
MLP units 
sold on public 
exchange to 
raise capital 
Shares of 
stock sold 
on public 
exchange 
to raise 
capital 
Shares of 
stock sold 
to raise 
capital 
 
3.0 1, 3 (2013), available at http://www.morganstanleyfa.com/public/projectfiles/ 
4735a09e-c35d-4545-a059-8873c8d057f0.pdf. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/5
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In terms of organization, MLPs are structured like any 
other limited partnership.  The composition consists of a general 
partner responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
company and several limited partners who are strictly 
investors.15  The general partner may be a sponsor company 
(often a corporation, but sometimes a limited liability company) 
or a group of individuals who oversee the company’s operation on 
a daily basis.16  The sponsor company owns whatever shares were 
not sold publicly plus a two percent general partnership interest 
and is typically a larger, publicly traded corporation.17 
The investors consist of unitholders who have purchased 
units via the stock exchange for the sole purpose of receiving a 
return on their investment.  The primary role of the investors is 
to infuse capital into the partnership and, as such, the investors 
are not involved in the routine management and operation of the 
company.18  While the general partner has a two percent 
ownership interest in the company, the investors, or limited 
partners, typically have a ninety-eight percent ownership 
interest.19 
As discussed previously, MLPs are publicly-traded on a 
national stock exchange, and, thus, units of the MLP are 
purchased in an initial public offering and then traded and sold 
much like corporate stock.20  Most MLPs are traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange, with a small number being traded on the 
NASDAQ.21 
 
 15. Donna D. Adler, Master Limited Partnerships, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 755, 
756–57 (1988); Conrad S. Cotello & Chris J. Muscarella, Matching 
Organizational Structure with Firm Attributes: A Study of Master Limited 
Partnerships, 1 EUR. FIN. REV. 169, 170 (1997). 
 16. Adler, supra note 15, at 756–57. 
 17. John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 
471, 474 (2005). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Philip H. Peacock, Recent Developments in Texas and the United States 
Energy Law, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 363, 440 (2009); Goodgame, supra 
note 17, at 473. 
 20. Master Limited Partnerships – 101, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, 
http://www.lw.com/MLP-Portal/101 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 21. Id. 
7
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There are three significant features that make MLPs 
attractive to investors from a cash distribution perspective.  The 
first is the requirement commonly found in most MLP 
partnership agreements that the partnership distribute all 
“available cash” to its partners.22  In analyzing several MLP 
partnership agreements, “available cash” is consistently defined 
as “all net cash generated by the MLP in the previous quarter 
less any reserves that the general partner determines to be 
necessary or appropriate in its reasonable discretion.”23  Although 
the amount of reserves necessary or appropriate is somewhat 
subjective, this requirement typically results in the distribution 
of a “significant portion of the cash generated by the MLP’s 
business operations.”24 These distributions typically substantially 
exceed the amounts of their dividend counterparts in the 
corporate setting, making MLPs an attractive option for 
investors.25 
Within this distribution structure is an additional 
“hidden” advantage.  While “distributions” may seem like just 
another name for what corporations call dividends, there is 
actually a notable difference between the two.  While corporate 
cash dividends are subject to taxation (which is the undesired 
second level of double taxation), MLP cash distributions are 
generally not taxed, which is a significant perk for investors.26 
A second feature that makes MLPs a desired structure for 
investors is the subordination of the general partner/sponsor 
company’s units. This feature is the successor of the 
“subordination period” common in early MLPs, prevalent in the 
1980s.27  Historically, MLPs had a subordination period 
 
 22. Goodgame, supra note 17, at 475. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 475 (citing Conrad S. Costello & Chris J. Muscarella, Matching 
Organizational Structure with Firm Attributes: A Study of Master Limited 
Partnerships, 1 EUR. FIN. REV. 169, 188 (1997)). 
 26. Id. at 472. 
 27. TIM FENN, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
(MLPS): A GENERAL PRIMER 1, 6  (2014), available at https://www.lw.com/admin/ 
Upload/Documents/MLP/Resources/Latham-Master-Limited-Partnership-
Primer-2014.pdf. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/5
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immediately following their initial public offering, in which the 
general partner/sponsor’s interests were subordinate to the 
limited partners’ interests. This preference structure was 
designed to ensure minimum distribution levels to investors.28 
Current MLPs still retain vestiges of this feature, in that 
limited partners by common units in the MLP, while the general 
partner/sponsor retains subordinated units.  Common units are 
similar to preferred stock in corporations, and subordinated units 
are comparable to common stock.  This means that limited 
partners are entitled to receive a minimum distribution each 
quarter, before the general partner/sponsor is allowed to receive 
any distribution of cash.29  These Minimum Quarterly 
Distributions are an attractive bonus for MLP investors. 
The third attractive feature of MLPs from an investment 
standpoint, are incentive distribution rights.  In addition to 
receiving distributions resulting from their two percent 
ownership interest, general partners typically also receive 
incentive distribution rights (IDRs), which allow the general 
partner to receive an increasing percentage of quarterly 
distributions once target distribution levels are met.30  Incentive 
distribution rights are designed to incentivize the general partner 
to rapidly grow the distributions to limited partners.  In addition 
to receiving distributions for any common units owned in the 
partnership, general partners also receive increasing incentive 
distributions that grow as the amount of the quarterly 
distribution grows.  Thus, the general partner’s distributions can 
grow from two percent to fifty percent.  The quarterly 
distributions of limited partners are decreased by the amount of 
the general partners’ IDRs.31 
The following graphic illustrates the basic structure of a 
typical MLP:32 
 
 28. Goodgame, supra note 17, at 476. 
 29. Id. 
 30. J.T. Carpenter, Master Limited Partnerships Shed a Tier, 53 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 381, 386 (2011). 
 31. FENN, supra note 27, at 4. 
 32. Id. at 3. 
9
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In addition to the cash-distribution benefits, MLPs also 
attract investors for the tax and capital accumulation benefits. 
First, MLPs can take advantage of pass-through taxation and are 
not subject to double taxation.33  Cash is taxed only once when 
distributed to unitholders, which effectively lowers the cost of 
capital and leaves more cash that can be distributed to the 
general partner and investors.34 The lower cost of capital provides 
MLPs with advantages in building and acquiring assets. Next, 
cash distributions are largely tax-deferrable. Unlike their 
corporate counterparts, dividends, cash distributions are not 
taxed when they are received. MLP cash distributions create a 
reduction in the investment’s cost basis, which means they are a 
tax liability that is deferred until the asset is sold. Since the 
structure of MLPs produces such significant cash distributions, 
much of the investor’s tax liability is deferred. In addition, since 
MLPs are publicly traded, they have the ability to raise capital 
from a broader range of investors.35  Public investors that would 
 
 33. Coons, supra note 4. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/5
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typically be limited to investing in corporations exclusively, now 
have the option of investing in MLPs and trading their units on a 
national security exchange.  
Finally, MLPs can own rate-regulated assets and still give 
investors an attractive rate of return.36  Even though assets are 
heavily regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
the aforementioned features (i.e. minimum quarterly 
distributions, subordination of general partner/sponsor units, and 
pass-through taxation) combine to ensure that the limited 
partner still receives the desired rate of return.37 
It is due to these vast benefits that MLPs have been a 
preferred business structure for oil and gas companies for many 
years. 
II. THE HISTORY OF MLPS 
Traditional limited partnerships have a long tradition in 
the United States and globally.38  However, limited partnerships 
have limitations. Most relevant, they do not lend themselves to 
growing investment or the frequent changing of partnerships 
because most states require a certificate of partnership on file 
that lists each partner.39  Each time the partnership takes on new 
investors, the certificate of partnership must be updated with the 
State.40  Master limited partnerships were contemplated as a 
solution to this problem of inflexibility.41  Under the new 
structure, a “master” limited partnership can be formed, which 
only requires the “master” partner to be listed in the certificate of 
partnership and further allows investors to buy and sell interests 
in the business without the need to update the certificate of 
partnership.42 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Adler, supra note 15, at 756. 
 39. Marvin F. Milich, Master Limited Partnerships, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 54, 56 
(1991). 
 40. Gordon B. Shneider, A Historical View of Limited Partnership Roll-Ups: 
Causes, Abuses, and Protective Strategies, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 403, 406 (1995). 
 41. Milich, supra note 39, at 56. 
 42. Id. at 56; see also Adler, supra note 15, at 757–58. 
11
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The first MLP was formed in 1981 by Apache 
Corporation.43  The need to form an MLP arose from Apache 
Corporation’s need to consolidate its general and limited 
partnership interests in the drilling funds it sponsored.44  Apache 
Petroleum Company was formed with Apache Corporation as its 
general partner, merging thirty-three of the corporation’s oil and 
gas programs formed between 1959 and 1978.45 
Although early MLPs existed primarily in the oil and gas 
arena, the business structure quickly caught on in a variety of 
other industries including everything from motels, real estate and 
amusement parks to casinos, cable companies and even sports 
teams.46  As the number of MLPs rapidly increased, Congress saw 
a need to prevent a trend in which a significant amount of 
companies began to form MLPs in order to avoid corporate 
income taxes.47 
The solution was found in restructuring the tax code to 
significantly limit the types of businesses that could organize as 
MLPs.48  Through the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue 
Act of 1987, Congress mandated that in in order to be taxed as a 
partnership, an MLP must derive at least ninety percent of its 
gross income from qualifying income sources.49  Under section 
 
 43. JOHN KELSO, APACHE CORP., AGAINST THE GRAIN 8 (Roger Plank ed., 1995), 
available at http://www.apachecorp.com/Resources/Upload/file/history/Apache_ 
Against_the_Grain_Apache_at_40.pdf. 
 44. Id. 
 45. ROBERT M. BROWN, APACHE CORP., JOURNEY INTO RISK COUNTRY: THE 
FIRST 30 YEARS OF APACHE CORPORATION 65–67 (Madeleine Meers ed., 2004), 
available at http://www.apachecorp.com/Resources/Upload/file/history/Apache_ 
Journey_into_Risk_Country_The_First_30_Years.pdf; see also Milich, supra note 
39. 
 46. Early MLPs included La Quinta Motor Inns Limited Partnership/Aircoa 
Hotel Partners, L.P., National Realty L.P., Cedar Fair, L.P. (an amusement 
park), Falcon Cable Systems Company, Sahara Casino Partners L.P., and 
Boston Celtics Limited Partnership. See FENN, supra note 27 at 9–10. 
 47. By 1987, there were over 100 MLPs in existence.  See FENN, supra note 
27, at 10. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99–514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 7704); Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100–203, tit. X, §§ 
10000-10714, 101 Stat. 1330–382 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7704). These 
legislations resulted in Section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/5
5_TOSON FINAL 8/24/2015  12:06 PM 
2015 MLPPA: FRIEND OR FOE? 297 
 
7704(d), qualifying income typically includes income and gains 
derived from the exploration, development, mining or production, 
processing, refining, transportation (including pipelines 
transporting gas, oil or products thereof) or the marketing of any 
mineral or natural resource.  Certain passive-type income 
including interest, dividends, and real property rents, as well as 
some other forms of income, are also included under section 
7704(d).50 
One year later in 1988, Congress further clarified the tax 
rules to provide that certain resources such as soil, sod, turf, 
water, mosses and minerals, seawater, air and other similar 
inexhaustible sources are excluded from the scope of qualifying 
income under the tax code.51  As such, renewable sources, such as 
agricultural products, or items that are unlimited in supply, such 
as solar power or wind, do not constitute natural resources under 
section 7704(d) and, therefore, are not considered qualifying 
income. 
The actions of Congress successfully redirected MLPs back 
to the energy industry, and the 1990s and 2000s saw an increase 
of MLPs in midstream oil and gas companies as well as MLPs 
involving the marine transportation of petroleum, propane 
distribution, coal, exploration, and production were established.52  
In 2008, in the midst of rising gas prices, Congress further 
amended the MLP tax rules via the Emergency Economic 
 
defined and clarified the scope of publicly traded partnerships.  See I.R.C. §§ 
7704, 7704(c)(3) (2012). 
 50. See LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 27, at 12 (“For purposes of the 
qualifying income rule set forth in the tax code, with respect to natural resource-
related activities, the term ‘mineral or natural resource’ means fertilizer, 
geothermal energy and timber, as well as any product from which a deduction is 
allowable, which includes oil, gas, and oil-and-gas related products. Typically, 
anything that is dug or pumped out of the ground qualifies, which includes coal, 
lignite, potash, salt, aggregates, limestone, sand and many other hard rock 
minerals.  Moreover, Congress made it clear in the legislative reports 
accompanying these qualifying income rules that, for purposes of determining 
the limits of what constitutes oil, gas, or products thereof, such term includes 
gasoline, kerosene, number-2 fuel oil, refined lubricating oils, diesel fuel, 
methane, butane, propane and similar products that are recovered from 
petroleum refineries or field facilities.”). 
 51. I.R.C. § 7704(c), (d) (2012). 
 52. Id. 
13
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Stabilization Act, which expanded the definition of qualifying 
energy sources to include transportation and storage of ethanol, 
biodiesel, various liquefied fuels, and industrial-source carbon 
dioxide.53  However, this amendment does not extend to activities 
beyond storage and transportation. Therefore, the manufacturing 
or sale of biodiesel or ethanol does not generate qualifying 
income. 
III. THE MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS PARITY 
ACT 
As previously discussed, master limited partnerships have 
been limited to investment in traditional energy projects in the 
oil, natural gas, coal extraction and pipeline industries.  
Introduced and drafted by Senator Chris Coons, the Master 
Limited Partnerships Parity Act would allow investors in 
renewable energy projects the ability to form MLPs.  According to 
Coons, “[t]hese projects get access to capital at a lower cost and 
are more liquid than traditional financing approaches to energy 
projects, making them highly effective at attracting private 
investment.”54 
By giving investors in renewable energy the opportunity to 
form MLPs, the Master Limited Liability Partnership Parity 
Act55 extends partnership tax treatment under the tax code to 
these investors.  The legislation extends the definition of 
“qualified” sources to include clean energy resources and 
infrastructure projects.56  Specifically covered are those 
renewable energy technologies that are covered under sections 45 
and 48 of the tax code.57 
 
 53. Note that this amendment is limited only to transportation and storage-
related sources, making the manufacture or sale of biodiesel or ethanol 
ineligible as qualifying income.  See 26 U.S.C. § 30C(c)(2)(A). 
 54. Coons, supra note 4. 
 55. H.R. 1696, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See I.R.C §§ 45, 48, (outlining rules for renewable energy production 
credit).  Under section 45, renewable energy resources include wind, closed-loop 
biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy, small irrigation 
power, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower production and marine and 
hydrokinetic renewable energy. § 45(c)(1). 
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In order to allow renewable energy investors the 
abovementioned opportunity to form an MLP, the bill expands 
the definition of “qualifying income” under § 7704 and § 613 of 
the tax code to include income and gains from renewable and 
alternative fuels (in addition to fossil fuels), including energy 
derived from thermal resources, waste, renewable fuels and 
chemicals, energy efficient buildings, gasification, and carbon 
capture in secure geological storage.58 
Under the current law, traditional energy projects have a 
distinct advantage over renewable energy sources in that they 
have the ability to form as MLPs, which affords them significant 
tax benefits and limited liability.  The goal of this bill is to create 
equity in the access to MLPs for both renewable and non-
renewable energy investments. This goal for equity is not new, as 
this is not the first time a bill designed to expand the tax code to 
give renewable energy investors access to MLPs has been 
introduced.  Senator Coons introduced similar legislation in 
2012.59  The 2012 proposed legislation was less specific than the 
current legislation and simply sought to amend the tax code to 
“extend the publicly traded partnership ownership structure to 
energy power generation projects and transportation fuels, and 
for other purposes.”60  H.R. 6437 was introduced on September 
19, 2012 and was referred to the House Ways and Means 
Committee.61  Unfortunately, the bill was never scheduled for a 
hearing and died there. In 2013, the bill was reworked producing 
the current legislation. 
IV. THE CASE FOR THE MASTER LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS PARITY ACT  
Supporters of the MLPPA cite various benefits of the Act. 
The primary argument in support of the MLPPA is that the MLP 
structure would increase investment in the renewable energy 
market.  The theory is that the many advantages of the MLP 
 
 58. I.R.C. § 613, 7704. 
 59. H.R. 6437, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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structure will have the same overwhelmingly positive impact on 
the renewable energy market that it has had on the traditional 
non-renewable energy industry.62  With access to partnership tax 
treatment, the ability to trade units on a public stock exchange 
and limited liability, the MLP structure has a much lower cost of 
capital than a corporation, for example. This makes it easier to 
attract investors who are looking for a flexible investment vehicle 
that offers tax advantages and still protects investors’ personal 
assets through limited liability.63 
A second argument in support of the MLPPA is that a 
significant influx of capital is required to support investment in 
renewable energy projects and the MLP business structure can 
help.  Individual investment in renewable energy is not enough to 
move the country toward clean energy in a significant way.64  
Access to MLPs brings large-scale investors such as corporations, 
retirement funds, and trust accounts.  These large-scale investors 
bring significant dollars to the renewable market, which is what 
is needed to make significant progress in the renewable energy 
industry and advance the clean energy agenda in the United 
States.65 
Most importantly, there is an issue of equity with the 
current state of the law.  Allowing non-renewable energy 
companies access to master limited partnerships as a choice of 
entity while denying renewable energy companies that same 
access is clearly discriminatory. The original fear was that the 
huge growth in the MLP industry in an effort to avoid corporate 
tax liability would lead to the erosion of the corporate tax base.66  
Nearly thirty years later however, this “threat” has not 
materialized. While MLPs are projected to cost the federal 
government a total of approximately $1.2 billion from 2011-2015, 
a recent study by Southern Methodist University anticipates that 
 
 62. Coons, supra note 4, at 2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Richard Caperton, Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) will Bring 
More Investment to Clean Energy, THINK PROGRESS (June 10, 2013, 12:19 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/06/10/2127651/master-limited-
partnerships-mlps-will-bring-more-investment-to-clean-energy/. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Adler, supra note 15, at 762. 
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renewable energy MLPs could raise approximately $7 billion in 
additional capital in the period from 2013-2020, which means 
that renewable energy MLPs will actually have a net positive 
economic impact.67  Therefore, there is no bona fide economic 
reason to continue this discriminatory practice at this point in 
our history.68  Not only is there no viable economic reason for the 
disparity, the current tax code hinders the United States from 
making significant and critically-needed progress toward 
reaching our clean energy goals.  According to Senator Coons, 
[a]t a time when the United States needs to increase domestic 
energy production and leaders of both political parties say they 
support an “all of the above” energy strategy, Congress should 
level the playing field and give all sources of domestic energy – 
renewable and non-renewable alike – a fair shot at success in the 
marketplace.69 
V. THE CASE AGAINST THE MASTER LIMITED 
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP ACT 
While the MLPPA has many supporters, there are those 
who are not proponents of the legislation, and several arguments 
have been made in opposition to the proposed Act. 
One of such argument is that allowing renewable energy 
companies access to the many tax advantages provided by MLPs 
would erode the federal tax base.70  The theory is the same as the 
original fear of the IRS in the late 1980s.  If companies other than 
non-renewable energy companies are allowed to take advantage 
of this choice of entity, there would be a huge rush to organize as 
MLPs.  Given the significant tax advantages that come with this 
choice of entity, namely that MLPs do not pay taxes at the 
 
 67. See Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Smarter Finance for Cleaner Energy: 
Open Up Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) to Renewable Energy Investment, BROOKINGS REMAKING 
FEDERALISM/RENEWING THE ECON. SERIES, 2012 at 4 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2174650 (discussing the 
need to “level the playing field” between renewable and non-renewable energy 
sources). 
 68. Id. at 3. 
 69. Coons, supra note 4, at 1. 
 70. See generally Mormann & Reicher, supra note 67. 
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company level and the tax liability generated is largely deferred 
until the sale of the investment, open access to MLPs would have 
the effect of reducing the overall federal tax revenue generated, 
resulting in a shrinking federal tax base.71 
Supporters of the legislation, however, disagree.  One 
counterargument is that individual investors would still pay 
taxes on distributions received, which would counteract the 
erosion of the federal tax base.72  In addition, access to master 
limited partnerships as a choice of entity would still be limited to 
energy companies as opposed to any company in any industry, 
which was the goal of the IRS when it initially limited access to 
this business structure.73  Furthermore, the attractiveness of this 
business structure from an investment standpoint would likely 
draw more investors to the renewable market, and therefore 
would actually increase the tax revenue generated.74 
Another criticism of the MLPPA is that if partnership tax 
treatment is extended to renewable energy investments, MLPs 
may be abused as tax shelters.75  The fear is that MLPs would be 
used solely to generate tax benefits and not necessarily to further 
progress in the renewable energy industry.76  There is yet another 
counterargument against this premise. Revisions to the tax code 
can always be structured in such a way that mandates that tax 
benefits gained as a result of MLP status actually result in bona 
fide renewable energy activities.77 
Yet another criticism of the MLPPA is that when looking 
at the model of traditional MLPs in the oil and gas sector, the 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. Critics have said the situation would be similar to the 1980s “wind rush.” 
See Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, How to Make Renewable Energy Companies 
Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/ 
02/opinion/how-to-make-renewable-energy-competitive.html?pagewanted=all&_ 
r=0&pagewanted=print (noting that the possibility of abuse of MLPs as tax 
shelters is a more valid concern than some of the other arguments against the 
MLPPA). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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lower cost of capital and the cost-savings generated by it have not 
trickled down to consumers.78  According to John Farell of the 
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, MLPs will lead to more large-
scale projects from large-scale investors, not individuals, and 
individual progress is not enough to produce the type of 
substantial progress we need to truly move forward with clean 
energy in the United States.79  This argument is flawed as well. 
Businesses are not designed to save consumers money. They are 
designed to increase the profits of the company and provide a 
desired return to investors. In fact, large-scale projects from 
large-scale investors are exactly what are needed to make the 
significant progress in the renewable energy industry that is so 
desperately needed in this country.80  Consider the example 
provided by Richard Caperton, Managing Director of Energy at 
the Center for American Progress. Using the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory’s Renewable Electricity Futures Study, he 
states: 
[G]etting to 80 percent renewable energy in the United States 
will cost just under $2 trillion . . .. Since there are about 115 
million households in the U.S., that means we would need about 
$17,000 in investment from every household to pay for new 
renewable power. Unfortunately, the median net worth of 
American families was about $77,000 in 2010, which means that 
we would need the middle-of-the-road family to invest a 
whopping 20 percent of their wealth in renewable energy. . . . 
This would be great for renewable energy, but it’s almost 
certainly a bad idea for families to invest 1/5 of their money in 
once specific industry, when we know the value of diversification. 
This means that we’re going to need money to come from other 
places, and this is where MLPs come into play. The dominant 
investors in MLPs are individuals, corporations, and various 
retirement accounts and trust accounts. These are big pots of 
 
 78. John Farrell, Why Master Limited Partnerships are a Lousy Policy for 
Solar, Wind, and Taxpayers, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD, June 3, 2013, 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/06/why-master-
limited-partnerships-are-a-lousy-policy-for-solar-wind-and-taxpayers. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Caperton, supra,note 64. 
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money, and it’s what we need to access if we want to get $2 
trillion into clean energy.81 
A final argument against the MLPPA is that although 
proponents of the legislation argue that it will have a huge 
impact on investments in the renewable energy market, it is more 
likely that this impact will be modest at best.82  The theory 
behind this argument is that MLPs are an ill fit for renewable 
energy investments.83  According to Robert Rapier, 
[t]he main reason so many MLPs have been successful is their 
concentration on energy infrastructure, a booming industry with 
a long history of profitability.  This has attracted conservative 
investors, and MLP tax rules have given them an incentive to 
stick around for the long run. . . . Most renewable energy 
investments are in a very different business. The vast majority of 
renewable energy companies exist as a result of mandates at the 
federal or state level.  I don’t mean to suggest that we shouldn’t 
support renewable energy, merely to note that if certain tax 
credits and mandates were eliminated, the industry would be 
decimated because for the most part it isn’t competitive with 
fossil fuels.  MLPs have a steady source of income from which to 
pay distributions. . . .  
The fact is that unless they can come up with long-term 
supply agreements that will see them through even if government 
support disappears, renewable energy MLPs could prove very 
risky investments.84 
 
 81. Id. The median net worth of American families has risen to $81,200 as of 
the most recent census data released in September 2014, however, the 
calculations in this example remain roughly the same. Middle of the road 
families would still need to invest just under 20% of their net worth in 
renewable energy. See Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances 
from 2010-2013: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 100 FED. RES. 
BULL. 1, 4 (2014). 
 82. William Pentland, MLP Parity Act: Disrupting Distributed Energy, 
FORBES (June 10, 2013) http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2013/06/10/ 
mlp-parity-act-disrupting-distributed-energy/print/ (citing Rapier, infra note 
84). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Robert Rapier, Is MLP Parity Act a Game Changer?, INVESTING DAILY 
(May 28, 2013) http://www.investingdaily.com/17512/is-mlp-parity-act-a-game-
changer/. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that there are many advantages to allowing 
renewable energy companies access to master limited 
partnerships as a choice of entity.  The financial and tax 
advantages of the MLP structure would increase investment in 
the renewable energy sector.  In addition, access to a financially 
attractive structure such as the master limited partnership 
structure attracts large-scale investors who will contribute a 
substantial influx of capital into the renewable energy market.  
This would bring about significant progress toward the clean 
energy agenda in the United States.  Finally, the current state of 
the law is inexplicably inequitable.  There appears to be no 
legitimate economic reason to allow non-renewable energy 
companies to organize as MLPs while denying renewable energy 
companies the same access. 
While there are disadvantages to this proposition as well, 
these disadvantages appear to be avoidable and easily remedied, 
if the proposed MLLPA is drafted carefully. The problems with 
the status-quo, however, can only be remedied through expansion 
of MLPs to include the renewable energy sector. Therefore, the 
advantages seem to far outweigh the minor, fixable 
disadvantages.  If this country is to truly move toward replacing 
fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, we must make drastic 
and significant changes to the portions of our tax code that hinder 
progress in the renewable energy sector.  Ultimately, is there any 
real downside to exploring this opportunity to stimulate and 
expand investment in renewable energy? 
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